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Evidence
By ROBERT G. LAWSON*
I. THE COTTON DOCTRINE-ANOTHER STEP FORWARD
A. Introduction
Prior to 1970 a criminal defendant who had elected to tes-
tify in his own defense could be impeached through the intro-
duction of evidence of any prior felony conviction.' In that year,
the Court of Appeals decided Cotton v. Commonwealth,2 in
which it greatly curtailed the use of such evidence. The Court
ruled that a criminal conviction is admissible for the impeach-
ment of a witness only if the crime involved dishonesty or false
statement. In addition, it ruled that when the witness being
impeached is a criminal defendant, a chambers hearing on
admissibility must be held before the jury is informed of the
prior conviction.
Although the requirements established by Cotton are clear
and unambiguous, for some inexplicable reason prosecutors
and trial court judges have been unable or unwilling to break
with pre-1970 practices and follow the Cotton ruling. In the
short time since the case was decided, the Court of Appeals has
found it necessary on several occasions to restate its intention
to curtail the use of this kind of evidence.' During the past term
alone the Court reversed three convictions because of the trial
courts' failure to comply with the requirements of Cotton.'
Only an application of the harmless error rule5 and an inade-
quate preservation of error6 prevented reversal in two other
cases.
The rulings in these five cases merely restate the principles
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1960, Berea College; J.D. 1963,
University of Kentucky.
See, e.g., Cowan v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1966).
2 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky. 1970).
See Lawson, Kentucky Law Survey-Evidence, 63 Ky. L.J. 677 (1975).
Phillips v. Commonwealth, 528 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1974); Graves v. Common-
wealth, 528 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1975); Burnett v. Commonwealth, 523 S.W.2d 229 (Ky.
1975).
Chamberlain v. Commonwealth, No. 75-73 (Ky., May 23, 1975).
Pickle v. Commonwealth, No. 75-16 (Ky., June 20, 1975).
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of Cotton. However, they are significant apart from their hold-
ings because through them the Court of Appeals expressed in
the most direct terms an understandable impatience with the
failure of the lower courts to comply with Cotton:
We have enunciated this rule repeatedly and in language
that is easily understood. The violation in this instance was
sufficient to prejudice the appellant's right to a fair trial
On a retrial of this case the proscriptions of Cotton v.
Commonwealth. .. must be observed.
7
In any event, the conviction for detaining a woman
against her will . . clearly had no bearing on the question
of the witness's veracity, nor did the owner's consent . . .
since guilt of the latter offense does not necessarily depend
upon an intent to steal or other dishonest purpose. Hence
under the rationale of Cotton v. Commonwealth . .. they
were not admissible.
. . . We are somewhat loath to reverse this conviction,
but we intend to have Cotton followed, and if this is the way
it has to be done, so must it be.8
The case was tried in June of 1974. Four years before that
time it had been announced in Cotton v. Commonwealth...
that evidence of a previous conviction for impeachment pur-
poses would thereafter be limited to felony convictions evinc-
ing dishonesty, stealing, or false swearing and that the nature
of the conviction should first be ascertained in a hearing or
conference held outside the presence of the jury. There was
absolutely no excuse for either the trial court or the prosecut-
ing attorney to be oblivious to such an important and fre-
quently occurring point of evidentiary law. Reversal in such
a case does not reflect a soft attitude on the part of appellate
judges toward crime and criminals. It is a direct result of the
trial court's failure to recognize and comply with the law.'
No interpretative comment about these statements is neces-
sary. The message conveyed is clear, and it is firm.
Graves v. Commonwealth, 528 S.W.2d at 667.
Phillips v. Commonwealth, 528 S.W.2d at 942.
Burnett v. Commonwealth, 523 S.W.2d at 231.
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B. Identification of the Underlying Felony
In only one case decided during the past year did the Court
of Appeals modify what has come to be known as the "Cotton
doctrine." That case, Bell v. Commonwealth,0 involved an
issue that was virtually certain to appear sooner or later. In
conformity with the requirements established in 1970, a cham-
bers hearing was held by the trial court to pass upon the admis-
sibility of a prior conviction. Finding that the offense underly-
ing the conviction involved dishonesty or false statement, the
court authorized the prosecution to use it for impeachment.
Pursuant to this authority, and in accordance with the practice
that prevailed before Cotton, the defendant was asked on cross-
examination if he had ever been convicted of a felony offense.
In framing the question, the prosecutor did not identify the
felony underlying the conviction. His failure to do so was the
cause for a motion for mistrial and the basis of complaint on
appeal.
The appeal focused on the fundamental concern which
promoted development of the Cotton principles. At the center
of the legal doctrine that originated with this case lies a fear of
distortion to the decision process, a belief that possible misuse
of prior convictions constitutes a genuine threat to the reliabil-
ity of judicial decisions. That this fear was involved in the most
recent consideration of the problem was not left to speculation:
"If the jury does not have that capability [i.e., to follow the
court's admonition to use the prior conviction only for credibil-
ity purposes] the defendant unfairly may suffer the harm of
the jury's being influenced to punish the defendant for his
habit of criminality."'" Consequently, like Cotton and its pro-
geny, Bell confronted the Court of Appeals with the task of
accommodating two distinct, conflicting needs: (1) The need
for evidence concerning an accused's credibility; and (2) the
need to assure that this evidence does not reflect improperly on
the accused's so-called "character." The resolution of this
problem produced the following addition to the Cotton rules:
520 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1975).
Id. at 317.
19751
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It is our opinion that if the prosecutor (after determina-
tion has been made out of the presence of the jury that the
prior felony is relevant to credibility) elects to ask as to con-
viction of an unidentified felony, the defendant (through his
counsel) should have the obligation to make a decision as to
whether he wants the identity of the offense to be disclosed.
If he does want it disclosed either he should request of the
trial court forthwith that he be permitted to state what the
prior offense was or he should, on redirect examination, make
the disclosure. If he does neither, it will be presumed that he
preferred that the offense not be identified.2
C. The Importance of Bell v. Commonwealth
The issue in Bell v. Commonwealth may well have been
viewed by the Court of Appeals as involving nothing more than
the method by which Cotton errors must be preserved for ap-
peal. The decision certainly creates no new "rights" for a crimi-
nal defendant. It recognizes no right in the accused to force a
disclosure of the crime underlying a prior conviction. Nor does
it provide the accused with a right to prevent disclosure of such
a crime. The decision merely acknowledges that an accused
may elect to disclose the underlying crime if the prosecutor
fails to do so in asking the impeaching question. Nevertheless,
the decision in Bell is a step forward in the development of this
area of evidence law. In the absence of an assumption that
every prosecutor, in every case, on every issue takes whatever
advantage of an accused the law allows, the decision provides
at least a modicum of additional protection against misuse of
a criminal defendant's prior record. In addition, of course, it
serves the benefit of further bridging the gap between the "old"
and "new" impeachment law by answering one of the few re-
maining questions about the vitality of pre-Cotton cases. 3 In
at least these two ways then, the case is progressive. Yet,
speaking in relative terms and confining it to its four comers,
12 Id. at 318.
" Before Cotton v. Commonwealth, the impeachment of a criminal defendant
began with an inquiry as to whether he had been previously convicted of a felony
offense. If he answered in the affirmative, the impeachment process was completed.
The jury was never informed of the specific offense underlying the felony. See Cowan
v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 695 (Ky. 1966).
[Vol. 64
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the decision is not one of monumental importance.
However, there is an unresolved issue under the Cotton
case which could greatly magnify the importance of Bell, if
presented in the right context. In Cotton the Court of Appeals
imposed on trial court judges a special responsibility to protect
defendants from prejudice that might result from introduction
of prior felony convictions. Even for convictions that qualify for
impeachment use (i.e., those involving dishonesty or false
statement), the trial court is obligated under Cotton to exercise
a "sound judicial discretion" in ruling on admissibility.'4 At
some point the Court of Appeals is certain to be confronted
with a need to provide a more detailed description of this dis-
cretionary responsibility than has been provided thus far.
When that occurs, there is one situation in which the Bell
decision could assume special importance.
The risk of prejudice to a criminal defendant from evi-
dence of a prior conviction is in a sense pervasive, for it is not
tied to factors such as the nature of the prior conviction or its
generic relationship to the offense charged. On the other hand,
the degree of risk in a given case is almost certainly dependent
upon such factors. For example, surely the risk of prejudice
would differ in the following instances:
(1) A defendant on trial for an offense of violence has a prior
conviction for a crime of dishonesty;
(2) a defendant on trial for an offense of dishonesty has a prior
conviction for a crime of falsehood; or
(3) a defendant on trial for an offense of falsehood has a prior
conviction for a crime of falsehood.
In other words, the intensity of the risk would seem to be at
least partially dependent upon the relationship between the
offense charged and the offense underlying the prior conviction.
The risk of prejudice to a defendant is at its zenith when there
is an absolute identity between the two offenses.' 5
11 Cotton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Ky. 1970).
15 Examples of such cases include a prior conviction for theft in a prosecution for
theft, a prior conviction of perjury in a case involving perjury, and a prior conviction
for armed robbery in a case involving armed robbery.
In imposing on trial judges the discretionary responsibility under discussion, the
Court of Appeals noted the special risk in such situations:
19751
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In what fashion does the Bell case relate to this problem?
Obviously, its holding has no direct relationship. However, the
method of impeachment approved by the Court of Appeals in
this decision could be utilized, with only a slight modification,
to minimize the risk of prejudice to an accused when that risk
is at its highest point. In cases involving absolute or substantial
identity between the offense charged and the prior felony con-
viction, the accused's "option on disclosure" could be made
unconditional. In other words, the prosecution would be pro-
hibited from revealing the felony underlying the conviction.
Lest someone conclude that this procedure is too drastic to be
seriously considered, it should be noted that this proposal is
virtually identical to the standard form of impeachment uti-
lized before Cotton. Its reinstatement in the resolution of this
important problem would seem to provide a reasonable accom-
modation to the conflicting interests involved. The prosecution
would have the benefit of its impeachment evidence, and the
risk of an erroneous decision because of prejudice would be
somewhat lessened. At the very least, the person subjected to
this risk would have a voice in the effort to control it. He could
decide, in a theft case for example, whether the jury is to be
informed that he is a "confirmed thief" or simply a "confirmed
felon."
II. HEARSAY AND THE REPORTED TESTIMONY EXCEPTION
A. Introduction
Commonwealth v. Bugg" involved the following fact situa-
tion. The defendant was charged with a crime for which a
preliminary hearing was required. A witness whose testimony
was crucial testified at that hearing on behalf of the prosecu-
tion and was cross-examined by counsel for the accused. All of
his testimony was recorded by a stenographer selected by the
accused. The witness then died before trial. Otherwise unable
The probability of prejudice is greater where the crime for which the defen-
dant is presently being tried is one of dishonesty or false statement, espe-
cially in those instances where he has been convicted several times
previously of the same type of crime.
Id. at 702.
Is 514 S.W.2d 119 (Ky. 1974).
[Vol. 64
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to make a prima facie case, the prosecution offered into evi-
dence a transcript of the witness' preliminary hearing testi-
mony. The defendant objected on the ground of the hearsay
rule, citing to the court: (1) A statute which in essence provides
that a transcript of testimony otherwise unavailable is admissi-
ble in a subsequent trial of the same issue, but only in the court
in which the testimony was originally given;7 and (2) provi-
sions in the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure which pro-
vide in combination that a transcript of testimony from a pre-
vious trial is admissible in a subsequent trial of the same
charge if the witness is dead, but only in the same court in
which the testimony was first given.'8 The trial court sustained
the objection to the transcript, and thereby brought the case
to a premature termination. The correctness of this ruling was
considered and upheld by the Court of Appeals.
The Court's interpretation and application in Bugg of the
above mentioned statute and court rules could easily be the
subject of an interesting discussion, one that could have no
objective, however, except scholarly exercise.'9 Unfortunately,
such a discussion would probably obscure an unquestionably
sound decision, and at the same time squander an opportunity
to focus attention upon an area of Kentucky evidence law that
is subject to a substantial degree of uncertainty. The circum-
stances that developed in Bugg presented an occasion for appli-
cation of the hearsay exception known as "reported testi-
mony." This exception, as the following discussion will reveal,
exists in this jurisdiction in a form that is unconventional in
structure, if not in substance. Its involvement in Bugg makes
the case worthy of comment.
" Ky. REV. STAT. § 422.150 (1971) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
" Ky. R. CRim. P. 7.20, 7.22.
" This is particularly true of the two rules of criminal procedure involved in the
case. The Commonwealth had urged the Court of Appeals to view Rules 7,20 and 7.22
as discovery rules, having only an incidental bearing on admissibility of evidence. The
Court properly refused. Would the Court have done so, however, if the Attorney Gen-
eral had argued instead that the two rules are for the perpetuation of evidence in
criminal cases? When one considers the two as a part of the series contained in Part
VII of the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure, the latter argument is far more
persuasive.
19751
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B. "Reported Testimony" in Kentucky
The hearsay rule of every jurisdiction in this country con-
tains an exception for "reported testimony," the purpose of
which is to allow the use of hearsay evidence that has been
tested through cross-examination in an earlier proceeding. 0
Admissibility of the evidence is uniformly dependent upon a
showing of unavailability of the witness who earlier gave the
testimony. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has described the
exception as follows:
It is a well-settled rule that whenever necessity exists,
such as arises when a witness dies after testifying, the testi-
mony of such witness upon a former trial may be shown upon
another trial, by one who heard the original testimony, pro-
vided that the issue in the two trials be substantially the
same, and provided that the party against whom the evidence
is offered upon the second trial cross-examined upon the for-
mer trial the witness, since deceased.
2'
As indicated by this statement, the exception consists of three
elements-necessity, a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness and identity of issues.
The first of these elements needs little description. It is
satisfied by the witness' death, absence from the state,22 mental
incompetence or physical impairment,n or by other conditions
or circumstances which make the evidence unavailable except
in hearsay form. The second requirement, that an opportunity
for cross-examination have existed at the prior proceeding, is
largely self-explanatory and, as the exception is typically ap-
plied, practically inconsequential. Except in highly unusual
circumstances, the party against whom the prior testimony is
offered will have been a litigant in the proceeding in which the
evidence was initially generated.24
11 "The reason of the law for recognizing the admissibility of the testimony ...
is that it was given under the solemnity of an oath, and with an opportunity for cross-
examination." Fuqua v. Commonwealth, 81 S.W. 923, 925 (Ky. 1904).
2 North River Ins. Co. v. Walker, 170 S.W. 983, 984 (Ky. 1914).
2 See Harbison & Walker Co. v. White, 114 S.W. 250 (Ky. 1908); Reynolds v.
Powers, 29 S.W. 299 (Ky. 1895).
" See Louisville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Johnson, 224 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. 1949).
2 One such exceptional case is Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Downing's
Adm'r, 167 S.W. 683 (Ky. 1914), which involved a claim that had to be tried twice.
[Vol. 64
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The third element, substantial identity of issues in the two
proceedings, is more difficult both to describe and to apply. It
is designed, of course, to assure that the hearsay evidence ad-
mitted under the exception has been adequately tested through
cross-examination in the first proceeding. The identity require-
ment is easily satisfied when the two proceedings involve a trial
and retrial of a single case. The matter becomes substantially
more complex, however, when the two proceedings do not in-
volve a single case, or, as in Bugg v. Commonwealth, they
involve a single case that has two distinct "trial-type" stages.
The manner in which the reported testimony exception is ap-
plied to this situation is illustrated well by the case of North
River Insurance Co. v. Walker.
25
In Walker the plaintiff sued the defendant insurance com-
pany for recovery under a fire insurance policy. The fire giving
rise to the suit had earlier led to a criminal arson charge against
the plaintiff. At the examining trial in the criminal proceeding
a witness, who died before institution of the civil action, testi-
fied to facts tending to prove an intentional burning. In the
civil action the insurer asserted the defense of fraud and offered
into evidence the prior testimony of the deceased witness. Two
circumstances surrounding this offer were obviously important.
The testimony was offered against the same party in both pro-
ceedings, and, more importantly, it was offered for the same
purpose (i.e., to prove an intentional burning) in both proceed-
ings. Consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions, the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the admissibility of the re-
ported testimony. Through this decision a relatively narrow
definition of the identity requirement was provided. Only on
the issue toward which the reported testimony is offered is
there a need for identity between the two proceedings.
Although the Kentucky law on "reported testimony," as
presented to this point, is neither unique nor uncertain, it takes
on both of these characteristics when the following statute is
considered:
After the first trial the plaintiff died and was replaced by a representative. The Court
of Appeals ruled that testimony given by the plaintiff in the first trial could be intro-
duced on behalf of the representative party in the second trial.
21 170 S.W. 983 (Ky. 1914).
19751
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The testimony of any witness taken by a stenographic
reporter pursuant to KRS 28.430 may, in the discretion of the
court in which it is taken, be used as evidence in any subse-
quent trial of the same issue between the same parties, where
the testimony of such witness cannot be procured, but no
testimony so taken shall be used in any criminal case without
the consent of the defendantY.
2
This, of course, is the statute that was involved in the Bugg
case. It came into existence in 1893 as a small part of an enact-
ment, the purpose of which was to provide for the appointment
of official stenographic reporters for full-docket courts.
27
Although the statute purports to authorize the introduc-
tion of hearsay evidence, it suffers from its own paralytic limi-
tations. For example, it is applicable only to testimony that has
been stenographically reported, and because of the phrase "in
the discretion of the court in which it is taken," the statute
applies only when a case is tried twice in the same court, as
noted in the Bugg opinion. Furthermore, the last phrase, which
gives a criminally accused a veto over admissibility, obviously
restricts its usefulness in criminal litigation. Since the common
law rule suffers none of these limitations, it was inevitable that
the Court of Appeals would ultimately have to define the stat-
ute's relationship to the common law exception for reported
testimony.
In two cases2 decided within a few years of the statute's
enactment the Court moved toward providing such a defini-
tion. The first one29 involved a criminal case that had to be
retried. In the interval between the first and second trials, a
witness died. The death created a need for the prosecution to
salvage the witness' testimony by use of a transcript from the
first trial. The defendant resisted introduction of the transcript
on the basis of the "veto" clause in the statute. On appeal,
following the trial court's admission of the evidence, the Court
of Appeals ruled that the statute was inapplicable to prior
testimony of deceased persons: "[I]t applies alone to the testi-
26 KRS § 422.150.
27 Ky. Acts ch. 269, at 1523 (1893).
28 Austin v. Commonwealth, 98 S.W. 295 (Ky. 1906) and Fuqua v. Common-
wealth, 81 S.W. 923 (Ky. 1904).
29 Fuqua v. Commonwealth, 81 S.W. 923 (Ky. 1904).
[Vol. 64
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mony of living witnesses . . . whose presence and oral testi-
mony cannot be procured for use in the subsequent trial."3' Of
greater importance, however, was the Court's ruling that the
common law exception for reported testimony fully justified
admissibility of the evidence in question.
The second case3' was nearly identical to the first one. It
involved a retrial of a criminal charge, a witness who died
during the interval between trials and an evidentiary offer of
the deceased witness' prior testimony at the second trial. The
two cases differed only with respect to the method of proving
the prior testimony. In the second case, bystanders at the first
trial were permitted to testify to the substance of the prior
testimony. The Court of Appeals again rejected a claim that
error had been committed by the trial court. In so doing it
made what is probably its most significant pronouncement
about the statute under discussion:
It is beyond question that the testimony of the deceased
witness was relevant on this trial. The ordinary method in-
deed, the method of proving it under the practice in this
state, was to introduce some person who heard it when given
by the witness, and who remembered it, or remembered the
substance of it . . . . Unless the statute relating to official
court stenographers has changed the practice, the same rule
must still prevail. Chapter 121, Ky. St. 1903 (being the act
of July 13, 1893) . . . contains the law regulating the appoint-
ment of official stenographic reporters, their duties, compen-
sation, and purposes for which their notes may be used. The
primary object of such notes is to make them, when extended
and signed by the presiding judge and stenographer, a part
of the bill of exceptions to be used on an appeal of the case.
They take the place of the witnesses' statements otherwise set
out in the bill of exceptions. . . . There is no provision of the
statute that makes the stenographer's "bill of evidence," as
it is sometimes called, the best evidence of what the witnesses
may have deposed, so that it will exclude all other evidence
on the subject. Least of all is there room for the contention
that it is made so in the trial of criminal cases.32
Id. at 924-25.
' Austin v. Commonwealth, 98 S.W. 295 (Ky. 1906).
32 Id. at 296.
1975]
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Several important messages are conveyed by this statement:
One, the statutory provision under discussion had no eviden-
tiary objective or character at the time of its enactment; 3 two,
it was neither designed nor intended to have an impact upon
the common law exception for reported testimony; and three,
the common law exception most certainly survived the enact-
ment of the statute.
During the 70 years that have elapsed since these twQ deci-
sions, the Court of Appeals has made no additional pronounce-
ments of importance about the relationship of the statute to
the common law rule. Perhaps nothing more remains to be
said. When these two cases are given thoughtful consideration,
the following conclusion concerning the importance of the stat-
ute seems inescapable: In every instance in which evidence is
made admissible by the statute, it is simultaneously admissi-
ble under the common law rule. To be more emphatic, to the
extent that the statute enunciates an evidence principle, it is
completely redundant. However, it has not been expressly rec-
ognized as such by the Court of Appeals, perhaps only because
no litigant has yet provided an opportunity. The lower courts
apparently have not detected the redundancy. The result has
been unnecessary confusion and difficulty, typified by that
which existed in Bugg v. Commonwealth, where the issue was
presented to the Court of Appeals in a state of grossly exagger-
ated complexity. Fortunately, the Court confronted the issue
as a simple, fundamental one.
C. A Modification of the Exception
The importance of the Court's decision in Bugg, that testi-
mony given in a preliminary hearing is not admissible under
any circumstances at a subsequent trial, is largely concealed by
the technical considerations of the case. On two prior occa-
sions, when faced with identical evidentiary circumstances, the
m This particular historical fact has been concealed by reorganization of the Ken-
tucky statutes. In 1936, the provision was still contained in the form in which it was
enacted, i.e., as a part of the law on "stenographic reporters." See Carroll's Ky. STAT.
ch. 121, § 4643 (1936). At the present time, it appears in KRS ch. 422 as an "evidence"
provision, totally separated from the other provisions of the enactment of which it is a
part. As a consequence, the statute appears to be something which it is not.
[Vol. 64
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Court of Appeals ruled in favor of admissibility of the prior
testimony. 4 Although the Court did not expressly overrule
these earlier cases, it effectively deprived them of any prece-
dential value.
The Court's rationale for modifying the reported testimony
exception is partially revealed by the following statement in
Bugg:
[T]he purpose of an examining trial and the issue to
which it is directed, that is, whether there is enough evidence
to justify holding or requiring security of the defendant pend-
ing further proceedings, is entirely different from the purpose
and issue to which a trial on the merits is directed, which is
a final determination of the ultimate question of guilt or inno-
cence. 5
Admissibility of "reported testimony," as described above, is
dependent upon a substantial identity of issues between the
proceeding from which the testimony is taken and the one in
which it is offered. The Court of Appeals has expressed its
judgment that this prerequisite is lacking when the first pro-
ceeding is a preliminary hearing in a criminal case. The reason
for this conclusion was expressed well by another court:
At the preliminary hearing . . . the cross-examiner is
much more narrowly confined by the nature of the proceed-
ing. The government's aim is merely to show a prima facie
case and its tactic is to withhold as much of its evidence as
it can once it has crossed that line. The fear of adding to the
government's case by extensive cross-examination weighs
heavily on a defendant's counsel at a preliminary hearing,
where much of the government's case remains still in doubt.
The cross-examiner therefore is in a far different position
than he would be at trial, where the government must go
beyond its prima facie case to convince the jury of the defen-
dant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Everyday experience
confirms the difference, for it is rare indeed that on a prelimi-
nary hearing there will be that full and detailed cross-
examination which the witness would undergo at the trial.
" See Lake v. Commonwealth, 104 S.W. 1003 (Ky. 1907); O'Brian v. Common-
wealth, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 563 (1869).
' 514 S.W.2d at 121.
1975]
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Credibility is not the issue at a preliminary hearing as it is
in a trial. All the arts of cross-examination which are exerted
to impair the credibility of a witness are useless in a prelimi-
nary hearing. 6
In other words, given the nature and purpose of a preliminary
hearing and the motivation and interests of an accused at such
a proceeding, a searching cross-examination of testimony is not
a realistic expectation.
When reduced to its bare essentials then, Bugg v.
Commonwealth represents a judgment that the reason for ex-
cluding hearsay evidence is not rendered inoperative by the
circumstances that prevailed in that case. A cross-examination
of testimony in a preliminary hearing is not, in the opinion of
the Court, equivalent to a cross-examination of the same testi-
mony at trial. The soundness of this judgment seems to be
beyond reasonable debate. Yet, few other courts have imposed
this limitation on the reported testimony exception to the hear-
say rule.
Ill. Two IMPORTANT CHANGES IN PRIOR LAW
A. Heilman v. Snyder-Learned Treatises
1. Introduction
Heilman v. Snyder" is probably the most important evi-
dence case decided during the past year. It involved a malprac-
tice action against a physician for negligently administering
medical injections. In his defense, the doctor attempted
through his own testimony to introduce a medical treatise on
the subject of injection procedures. Although rejected by the
trial court when offered on direct examination, the evidence
was accepted when offered on redirect. After a verdict for the
defendant, the plaintiff appealed on the ground that the ad-
mission of this evidence constituted reversible error.
The prevailing rule at the time of this case favored the
plaintiff's position. It had been described by the Court of Ap-
peals as follows: "The rule is that medical books are not admis-
' Government of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 549 (3d Cir. 1967).
520 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1975).
[Vol. 64
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sible as affirmative evidence. . . but the standard authorities
may be read as a part of a question to a witness, or cross-
examination, to test the accuracy of his information and the
value of his expert testimony."3 s Thus, statements from learned
treatises could not be introduced as testimonial assertions of
truth, but they could be used in the cross-examination of an
expert witness for impeachment purposes.
In the Heilman case the Court of Appeals overruled its
earlier decisions, and substituted the following principle to
govern the use of data contained in treatises:
We now adopt the Uniform Rules of Evidence that publi-
cation by experts should be admitted in evidence to prove the
truth of a matter stated therein if the judge takes judicial
notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is a reliable authority on the
subject."
2. The Requirement of a Witness
The Court of Appeals not only overruled its own prior deci-
sions in Heilman, it also adopted an evidence principle that
does not comport with the law of most other jurisdictions. As
might be expected, the Court exercised a degree of caution in
reaching its decision. It restricted the new rule to prospective
application, affirming the lower court by finding that the "trea-
tise" evidence was merely cumulative. More importantly, the
Court did not use the case to attempt a full development of this
area of evidence law. Instead, it did nothing more than provide
a new exception to the hearsay rule for future use. Conse-
quently, one can confidently predict that the final word on
learned treatises is yet to come. Several significant questions
about this new hearsay exception were not presented by the
facts of Heilman, and, therefore, were not considered by the
Court of Appeals.
Probably the most critical question still to be answered
concerns the manner in which evidence from learned treatises
must be introduced. Is a litigant to be permitted to arm himself
11 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Davies, 153 S.W. 956, 959 (Ky. 1913). See also Kentucky
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Topmiller, 263 S.W. 706 (Ky. 1924).
31 Heilman v. Snyder, 520 S.W.2d 321, 323 (Ky. 1975).
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with loads of professional books and journals and to read to the
jury from the great works of science, medicine, art, or history?
Or will he be required to produce an expert witness and intro-
duce the data from the treatise through that witness? It is
arguable, although far from certain, that the decision in
Heilman resolves this issue. The Court stated that evidence
from treatises should be admitted "if the judge takes judicial
notice . . . that the treatise, periodical, or pamphlet is a reli-
able authority on the subject. ' ' 40 Does this mean that the evi-
dence need not be introduced through an expert witness? The
answer to this question, when it comes, may turn upon the
Court's use of the following provision from the Uniform Rules
of Evidence:
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissi-
ble except:
(31) Learned Treatises. A published treatise, periodical
or pamphlet on a subject of history, science or art to prove
the truth of a matter stated therein if the judge takes judicial
notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the
treatise, periodical or pamphlet is a reliable authority in the
subject.'
This provision, which was part of the 1953 edition of the Uni-
form Rules, contains no prohibition against the "mere intro-
duction," without the use of a witness, of a learned treatise. In
late 1974 a revised version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. The provision in the 1974 version corre-
sponding to the one used in Heilman v. Snyder reads as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule. ...
(18) Learned Treatises. To the extent called to the at-
tention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied
upon by him in direct examination, statements contained in
published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of
history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a
40 Id.
" UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63 (31) (1953).
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reliable authority by testimony or admission of the witness or
by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted,
the statements may be read into evidence but may not be
received as exhibits.
42
The principal difference between the two rules is the prohibi-
tion in the 1974 version against the "mere introduction" of a
learned treatise.
For all practical purposes this new provision was not avail-
able to the Court at the time it decided Heilman. The case was
probably considered by the Court in late 1974 or early 1975,
since the opinion is dated March 7, 1975. The briefs of the
parties were filed before the end of 1972, two years before adop-
tion of the new Uniform Rules. An examination of the briefs
reveals that the parties did not address the manner in which
learned treatises should be introduced. 43 Consequently, it
seems almost certain that the Court of Appeals did not con-
sider the issue. It must be acknowledged, however, that there
is at least a particle of doubt in this conclusion, for the Court
quoted a provision from the Federal Rules of Evidence that is
identical to the revised version of the Uniform Rules. Neverthe-
less, when all aspects of Heilman are taken into account, in-
cluding the fact that at trial the evidence was introduced
through an expert, the question of whether a learned treatise
must be introduced through the testimony of an expert witness
remains open.
Consequently, pending further action by the Court of Ap-
peals, the trial courts of this state will have to decide for them-
selves the manner in which treatises are to be introduced. In
confronting this issue, it is important that trial judges give
thoughtful consideration to the rationale underlying the recent
change of attitude concerning the evidentiary use of scholarly
materials. Until quite recently, most authorities have con-
cluded that juries should not be given the benefit of data con-
tained in scholarly works." Only two reasons have been promi-
nently offered to support this conclusion. First, a treatise,
42 Id. at 803 (18).
' Brief for Appellant, Brief for Appellee, Reply Brief for Appellant, Heilman v.
Snyder, 520 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1975).
1 6 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1693-94 at 7-9 (3d ed. 1940).
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being an extrajudicial utterance, is hearsay evidence and there-
fore not subject to cross-examination. Second, because of its
technical and complex nature, a treatise is subject to great risk
of misuse and misapplication by judicial decision-makers. The
new attitude toward the evidentiary use of treatises does not
emanate from a rejection of these thoughts, but instead from a
judgment that the long-standing objections to this evidence
can be substantially satisfied by controlling the circumstances
under which a jury is allowed to receive the data. The best
indication of this judgment is contained in a comment by the
drafters of the new federal rules:
The rule [i.e., the learned treatises exception] avoids
the danger of misunderstanding and misapplication by limit-
ing the use of treatises as substantive evidence to situations
in which an expert is on the stand and available to explain
and assist in the application of the treatise if desired."
In other words, adequate understanding of the evidence can be
guaranteed through a requirement that it be introduced by a
witness who is expert in the subject matter of the treatise. At
the same time, this requirement would provide the opponent
of such evidence an opportunity for some measure of cross-
examination.
In the absence of this control over the circumstances under
which a treatise can be introduced, the previously described
reasons for exclusion are as compelling as ever. Consequently,
until the Court of Appeals has had an opportunity to speak
directly to this issue, lower courts would be well-advised to
adopt the prevailing practice in federal courts, under which
learned treatises are admissible only "to the extent called to
the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or
relied upon by him in direct examination."46
3. The Treatise as an Exhibit
One other question concerning the new hearsay exception,
although of lesser importance, is worthy of brief mention. The
1953 version of the uniform rule, to which reference was made
" FED. R. EviD. 803 (18).
46 Id.
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in Heilman, contained no prohibition against the introduction
of a treatise as an exhibit. The federal rule, to which reference
was also made, and the revised uniform rule provide that a
treatise may be read to the jury but may not be introduced as
an exhibit. Does this combination of circumstances mean that
the Court of Appeals intends to allow the introduction of trea-
tises as exhibits?
At an earlier time the Court believed that such a practice
was ill-advised: "The printed word has an unconscious influ-
ence over us all. What is read from a book, recognized as au-
thority, has more weight than the same expression from the
mouth of a witness."47 Apparently, this belief was repudiated
in Heilman. After referring to its prior observation, the Court
of Appeals said: "We have recognized the sophistication of
modern jurors when we deal with problems of evidence in the
field of criminal law. Surely the juror of today is no less sophis-
ticated in a civil case."" It seems virtually certain, from the
context in which this observation was made, that the Court
intended to approve the introduction of treatises as exhibits. In
the absence of actual experience with this new hearsay excep-
tion, there seems to be no rational basis upon which to prefer
the federal rule prohibiting use of medical treatises as exhibits
over the one which the Court apparently adopted.
B. Rachel v. Commonwealth-The Best Evidence Rule
In many instances when a litigant is attempting to prove
the contents of a writing, the particular writing required by the
"best evidence" rule will be obvious. Frequently, there is only
one writing, as the choice presented is between a writing and
oral testimony about the writing. In other instances, however,
choice must be made between two writings, a so-called "origi-
nal" and a "copy." In such situations the "best evidence" is not
always readily apparent. Although the terms "original" and
"copy" have a precise, well-understood relationship to each
other, they have no inherent relationship to the best evidence
rule.
' Kentucky Pub. Serv. Co. v. Topmiller, 263 S.W. 706, 708 (Ky. 1924).
520 S.W.2d at 323.
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For many years the law of Kentucky has treated a certain
kind of copy as equivalent to an original for purposes of this
rule.49 The nature of such a copy is described in the following
statement:
A carbon copy of a letter, i.e., a carbon impression made
simultaneously with the original, is a duplicate original and
not a copy thereof. The carbon impression may be used, as
well as the impression made by the type or the pencil causing
the indention; and, when properly authenticated, as it was in
this case, becomes an original for all purposes."
As implied by the label "duplicate original," qualification for
treatment as an original is limited under this rule to a copy
made simultaneously with the original. Recently, however, the
Court of Appeals has broadly expanded the admissibility of so-
called duplicates.
In the case of Rachel v. Commonwealth5 a criminal defen-
dant argued that the best evidence rule had been violated when
the prosecution introduced a thermofax copy of a written con-
fession. In resolving this issue against the defendant, the Court
of Appeals recognized that the only legitimate reason for pre-
ferring an "original" over a "copy" is to avoid errors on the part
of the copyist, and held that in applying the best evidence rule
a trial court need not distinguish between a "photo copy" and
a "duplicate original."52 As a consequence of this decision, a
copy made by a modern reproduction technique is equivalent
to an original for evidence purposes and may be introduced
without explanation of non-production of the original.
" See, e.g., Gus Dattilo Fruit Co. v. Louisville & N. R.R., 37 S.W.2d 856 (Ky.
1931).
11 Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Louisville Trust Co., 175 S.W.2d 524, 528
(Ky. 1943).
51 523 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1975).
52 The precise ruling of the Court of Appeals was as follows:
Where a photo copy of the original is produced, there is no chance of a
mistake upon the part of the scrivener in copying it, and exact replicas of
handwriting and figures are produced. In the absence of some showing that
the copy was altered or otherwise not an accurate copy-or that the water-
mark or quality of the original paper was an important evidentiary factor,
there does not appear to be any real reason for distinguishing between a
photo copy and a duplicate original although such a distinction prevails in
most jurisdictions.
Id. at 401.
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